Pig producers' perceptions of the Influenza Pandemic H1N1/09 outbreak and its effect on their biosecurity practices in Australia. by Hernandez-Jover, Marta et al.
1 | P a g e  
 
Postprint 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in [Prev Vet Med] on [7 April 2012], available online: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167587712001067  
 
Please cite as: 
Hernandez-Jover, M., Taylor, M., Holyoake, P., & Dhand, N. (2012). Pig producers' perceptions of the Influenza 
Pandemic H1N1/09 outbreak and its effect on their biosecurity practices in Australia. Prev Vet Med, 106(3-4), 
284-294.         doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.03.008 
 
 
 
Pig producers’ perceptions of the Influenza Pandemic H1N1/09 
outbreak and its effect on their biosecurity practices in Australia 
 
Marta Hernández-Jover1*, Melanie Taylor2 , Patricia Holyoake3 and Navneet Dhand1 
 
1 University of Sydney, Faculty of Veterinary Science, 425 Werombi Rd, Camden NSW 2570, 
Australia.  
2 School of Medicine, University of Western Sydney, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith South DC NSW 2571. 
3 Department of Primary Industries, Corner of Midland Hwy and Taylor St, Epsom VIC 3551 
 
 
*Corresponding author at: Charles Sturt University, School of Animal and Veterinary Science, Locked 
Bag 588, Wagga Wagga, NSW 2678, Australia. Tel: +61 (0) 2 69332086; fax: +61 (0) 2 69332991; 
Email address: mhernandez-jover@csu.edu.au (M. Hernández-Jover) 
 
 
Abstract:  
The Influenza Pandemic (H1N1/09) virus was first reported in humans in Mexico in April 2009 and a 
pandemic level was declared on 11th of June 2009 by the World Health Organization (Chan, 2009; 
WHO, 2009a). Public misconceptions about the transmission of H1N1/09 were caused by the 
inadequate naming of the disease as ‘swine influenza’. This cross-sectional study was conducted at 
the height of the outbreak in the Australian human population and before the virus was reported in 
the first piggery in Australia in July 2009 (OIE, 2009b; Holyoake et al., 2011). The aims of this study 
were to evaluate pig producers’ perceptions about the virus and the outbreak financial impact and 
influence on on-farm biosecurity practices. A questionnaire was designed and posted to Australian 
Pork Limited (APL) members (n = 460), obtaining responses from 182 producers (39.6%). Pig 
producers had good general knowledge on potential transmission pathways for H1N1/09 between 
people, with direct or close contact with a sick person perceived as the most likely pathways. 
Changes on biosecurity practices, such as asking visitors if they had recently been overseas (27.8%) 
and not allowing any visitor to inspect their pigs (18.3%), were reported among respondents. In 
addition, approximately 40% of producers asked their employees to notify flu like symptoms, 
consulted a veterinarian on H1N1/09 and visited websites to seek information on H1N1/09. A higher 
adoption of these practices was observed among large (> 100 sows) than small herds. Only 2.9% of 
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respondents reported a reduction in pig sales during the outbreak. However, approximately one 
third of producers reported being financially and emotionally stressed, 38.2% were distressed about 
the health of their pigs and 16.7% about their own health. The most important sources of 
information were APL (93%), veterinarians (89%) and the state Department of Primary Industries 
(DPI) (75%). The first two considered the most trusted sources of information. Television, radio and 
other farmers were considered more important sources of information by small herds and 
veterinarians by larger herds. Producers believed that the H1N1/09 outbreak was better managed by 
the pork industry (89.9%) than by the health authorities (58.8%), and the on-going communication 
with APL was the main strength of the outbreak management. Communication and extension 
programs in future outbreaks should consider the needs of all sectors of the pig industry to increase 
their effectiveness. 
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Introduction 
In April 2009, Influenza Pandemic (H1N1/09), a novel H1N1 influenza A virus, was isolated in Mexico 
(WHO, 2009a). In the following two months, the virus spread rapidly among the human population 
worldwide and on 11th of June 2009 the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a pandemic 
alert level (Chan, 2009; WHO, 2009a). By July 2010, the H1N1/09 virus had caused more than 18,000 
deaths (WHO, 2000b).  
The H1N1/09 virus is a reassortant with at least three parents, containing genes from swine, avian 
and human influenza viruses (Gibbs et al., 2009; Kou et al., 2009), which originated in humans. 
Although no link between an animal and the first human cases has been established (Vallat, 2009), 
the disease was named ‘swine influenza’ or ‘swine flu’ from the start of the outbreak. This, together 
with the lack of available information on the epidemiology of the disease and the excessive and 
sometimes ill-informed media coverage, caused public misconceptions about the transmission of 
H1N1 to humans (Lau et al., 2009, 2011; Dhand et al., 2011). Public perceptions on the H1N1/09 
outbreak and the transmission of the virus have been previously investigated (Goodwin et al., 2009; 
Lau et al., 2009; Dhand et al., 2011; Lau et al., 2011). The most common misconceptions on the 
transmission of the virus were: airborne spread across long-distances and transmission via eating 
cooked pork and handling uncooked pork.  
These perceptions had a significant impact on the pig industry, with unjustified bans on imports of 
pigs and pig products and destruction of all pig populations in some countries (Vallat, 2009). This 
happened despite a joint statement on the safety of pork and pork products released by the WHO, 
the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (Vallat, 
2009). Goodwin et al. (2009) reported that 7% of respondents of a survey in Europe had either 
reduced or stopped eating pork. Similarly, 11.1% of the people surveyed in the Greater Sydney area 
reported changing their pork eating habits due to the outbreak, including 5.2% who stopped eating 
all pig meat products (Dhand et al., 2011). Market research conducted during the H1N1/09 
pandemic indicated a 6% decline in consumer preference for pork after the outbreak (APL, 2009). 
The first confirmed case of H1N1/09 virus infection in commercial pigs was in Alberta (Canada) in 
late April 2009 (OIE, 2009a; Wong et al., 2011). In Australia, the first H1N1/09 infection of 
commercial pigs occurred in July 2009 (OIE, 2009b; Holyoake et al., 2011). Although the effect of the 
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H1N1/09 pandemic on the pig industry has been investigated to some extent, perceptions of pig 
producers regarding the pandemic and its effect on on-farm biosecurity practices have not been 
previously studied. This study, conducted at the height of the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans and 
before the first piggery infection in Australia, aimed to investigate: (a) pig producers’ perceptions 
about the transmission of the H1N1/09 virus; (b) the impact of the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans on 
their enterprises; (c) the sources of information used by producers regarding the H1N1/09 outbreak; 
and, (d) pig producers’ opinions about the management of the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans. 
Results from this study may be used to inform management and communication strategies in future 
outbreak events affecting the pig industry.  
 
1.  Material and methods 
Pig producers’ perceptions of the Influenza Pandemic H1N1/09 outbreak in humans were 
investigated in a study among Australian Pork Limited (APL) members, the representative body of 
the pig industry in Australia. The study was conducted during the height of the H1N1/09 pandemic in 
humans in Australia (June and July 2009) and before the first outbreak was reported in pigs. The 
experimental procedures used for this study were approved by the Human Ethics Committee of The 
University of Sydney, Australia (Approval #06-2009/11932).  
 
1.1. Questionnaire design 
A questionnaire was developed with the aim of investigating pig producers’ perceptions about the 
H1N1/09 pandemic in humans. The questionnaire, written in English, consisted of 5 pages with 19 
questions, including open (n = 6), semi-closed (n = 7) and closed (n = 6) questions. Questions were 
written in a simple and clear format to minimize confusion and maximize accuracy of response 
(Dohoo et al., 2003; Thrusfield, 2005). Topics covered in the questionnaire included producers’ 
perceptions about the transmission of the virus, the financial impact of the outbreak on their 
enterprises, the influence of the outbreak on their on-farm biosecurity practices, sources of 
information used by producers during the outbreak and their opinions about management of the 
outbreak. The questionnaire was piloted with three pig producers and subsequently modified to 
improve understanding prior to distribution. Completion time for the questionnaire was estimated 
at 10 minutes. A copy of the questionnaire is available from the corresponding author on request. 
  
1.2. Distribution of questionnaires 
A census approach among members of APL was used for the selection of survey participants as the 
APL register is the only national database of pig producers in Australia. Questionnaire packs, 
containing a covering letter, a participant information sheet and a self-addressed, postage paid 
return envelope were sent to members via APL, to maintain confidentiality. A proposed second mail-
out was cancelled following the first outbreak of H1N1/09 in a piggery in Australia as it was felt this 
event would have significantly impacted the producers’ responses compared to the first mail-out 
conducted pre-outbreak. Twenty producers were randomly selected to receive a $50 gift voucher as 
an incentive to participate.  
 
1.3. Data Management and analysis 
Responses from the returned questionnaires were entered in Microsoft Access (Microsoft, 
PC/Windows XP, 2006, Redmond, WA, USA) and checked for data entry errors. The SAS statistical 
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program (© 2002-2003 SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) was used for the descriptive and statistical 
analysis.  
Frequency tables were created for the descriptive analysis of the data for the following outcome 
variables: 1) producers’ interest in information about the H1N1/09 outbreak; 2) their opinion on the 
importance of different sources of information on animal health issues related to the H1N1/09 
outbreak; 3) their perceptions about the activities likely to pose a risk of disease transmission; 4) 
changes in biosecurity practices applied on-farm during the H1N1/09 outbreak; 5) their level of 
stress due to the H1N1/09 outbreak (financial, emotional and about their own health and the health 
of their pigs); 6) their opinion on the likelihood of an outbreak of H1N1/09 occurring in pigs in 
Australia; 7) their perception of their preparedness to prevent or control an H1N1/09 outbreak in 
their piggery; 8) their perception of the stringency of their farm’s hygiene and disease prevention 
practices; and 9) their opinion on how the H1N1/09 outbreak situation was managed by the health 
authorities and the pork industry.  
Associations of these variables with age, gender, location (New South Wales, NSW; Queensland, 
QLD; South Australia, SA; Tasmania, TAS; Victoria, VIC; and, Western Australia, WA) and herd size 
were initially investigated through contingency tables and univariable logistic regression analysis 
using the SAS LOGISTIC procedure assisted by UniLogistic macro (Dhand, 2010). Categories of 
explanatory variables are described in Table 1. Most of the outcome variables were ordinal with five 
categories but were transformed to binary variables for conducting binomial logistic regression 
analysis based on agreement or disagreement in relation to the question statement (i.e. extremely, 
very and moderately likely compared to very and extremely unlikely).   
 
 
If the explanatory variables were associated with the outcome during the univariable analysis at 10% 
level (i.e. P < 0.1), then multivariable logistic regression models were constructed using the SAS 
LOGISTIC procedure by including the significant explanatory variables to further evaluate their 
associations after adjusting for each other. Significant variables with a P-value <0.05 in the 
multivariable model were retained in the final model. However, age and gender were forced into all 
the final models as potential confounders.  
Qualitative data from two of the open questions were analysed using content analysis to identify 
thematic categories (Franzosi, 2004). These questions investigated producers’ opinions on the 
strengths of the outbreak management and opportunities for improvement. Responses to each of 
these questions were read three times to ensure familiarity with the data prior to coding by themes. 
An interpretive coding of the responses was used, being driven by the data itself and not by pre-
determined categories (Franzosi, 2004). Responses were then grouped together by thematic 
categories and frequency distributions calculated. Five categories were created for the qualitative 
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open question on the description of the clinical signs of swine influenza in pigs, according to the 
clinical signs identified by producers in comparison to a set of seven common clinical signs of swine 
influenza described by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE, 2009c). This set of clinical 
signs included general clinical signs (fever, lethargy and weight loss) and specific respiratory clinical 
signs (laboured breathing, nasal discharge, coughing and sneezing). Categories were: 1. ‘Don’t know’ 
response; 2. Less than three clinical signs; 3. Between three and four clinical signs; 4. Five or more 
clinical signs; and, 5. Other clinical signs. This last category included responses that did not include 
any of the common clinical signs.  
 
2. Results 
 
2.1. Response rate and general information about respondents  
The questionnaire was distributed among 460 APL members and 182 responses were obtained 
(39.6% response rate). Of respondents who provided information on age and gender (180/182), 
72.8% were males and 27.2% were females. Among these producers, 74.4% were over 44 years of 
age, of which 22.4% were over 65 years of age. Distribution of respondents by location and herd size 
is shown in Figure 1. Among producers with available information on location and herd size 
(172/182), 39% had 0 to 99 sows, 38% had 100 to 499 sows, 9% had 500 to 999 and 14% had more 
than 1,000 sows. Most producers housed their pigs (breeding stock and progeny) indoors (63.9%), 
followed by indoor housing with bedding (ecoshelters) for growing pigs (25.2%), and outdoor 
housing in pens or paddocks for breeding stock (16%). 
 
Figure 1.  Location and herd size distribution of pig producers participating in a study on H1N1/09 
perceptions in Australia. 
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2.2. Producers’ perceptions on the H1N1/09 outbreak 
 
2.2.1. Risk of contracting H1N1/09 
Table 2 shows producers’ perceptions about activities likely to pose a risk of contracting H1N1/09.  
Most producers believed that travelling on public transport with a sick person present (93.9%) and 
shaking hands with a sick person (89.8%) were the most likely activities posing risk of contracting the 
virus. Other activities identified as potential sources of contracting the virus were attending a 
community gathering (76.3%) and swimming in a community pool (32.0%). Eating cooked pork and 
drinking tap water were the activities perceived as least likely to pose a risk of H1N1 transmission 
(0.6% and 2.9%, respectively). Age, gender and herd size were not significantly associated with these 
perceptions.  
 
 
 
2.2.2. Risk of an outbreak of H1N1/09 occurring in pigs 
A large proportion of producers (63.1%) believed an H1N1/09 outbreak in piggeries in Australia was 
likely to occur (moderately to extremely likely); however, 36.9% of respondents had the perception 
that an outbreak in pigs was very or extremely unlikely. Regarding preparedness to prevent and 
control a potential outbreak of H1N1/09 in pigs, most producers (81.2%) believed they were 
somewhat to very well prepared. Over half of respondents (59.7%) believed their farm’s hygiene and 
disease prevention practices were stringent. However, over a third rated their practices as only 
average (36.4%), or worse (4.0%). No significant differences were observed on these variables 
according to age, gender, herd size or location of the piggery during the univariable logistic analysis. 
However, women (89.4%) tended (P = 0.074) to believe they were better prepared for preventing 
and controlling an outbreak than men (78.0%). 
 
2.2.3. Clinical signs of swine influenza in pigs 
A total of 144 (79.1%) producers responded to the open question on the clinical signs of swine 
influenza in pigs. Of these, 11 producers (7.6%) did not know any of the clinical signs of swine 
influenza and 36.1% stated less than three clinical signs. Approximately half of producers were able 
to state more than three clinical signs (41.0% between three and four; and 8.3% five or more). In 
addition, 10 producers (6.9%) stated other clinical signs. Producers in this last group provided non-
specific clinical signs (‘similar to human flu’, ‘similar to other respiratory diseases in pigs’, ‘sudden 
death’). 
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2.2.4. Management of the outbreak 
 
2.2.4.1. Quantitative results on the effectiveness of the management: The questionnaire 
investigated pig producers’ perceptions on the management of the outbreak by the health 
authorities and the pork industry. Most producers (89.9%) believed the outbreak was managed 
appropriately by the pork industry. However, a significant proportion of producers (42.2%) thought 
the outbreak was poorly managed by the health authorities. 
Perceptions of outbreak management by the health authorities and the pork industry differed 
according to the location of the piggery. A higher proportion of producers from NSW (64.7%; P = 
0.021) compared to those in SA (40.0%; OR 0.36, 95% CI 0.15 – 0.87) believed the outbreak was well 
managed by the health authorities. Similarly, more producers in NSW (96.1%) than in QLD (78.8%; 
OR 0.15, 95% CI 0.02 – 0.68) considered that the outbreak was well managed by the pork industry. 
No significant differences in the perception of outbreak management were observed according to 
age, gender or herd size.  
 
2.2.4.2. Qualitative results on the strengths and weaknesses of the management of the outbreak: 
Of the participants, 92 (50.5%) responded to the question regarding the strengths of the outbreak 
management and five main themes were identified. A proportion of producers (24/92; 26.1%) 
identified the on-going communication and information delivery from APL as the main strength of 
the outbreak management. Moreover, some producers (17/92; 18.5%) believed the strength of the 
outbreak management was the readily available information from government and general media. A 
similar proportion of producers (18/92; 19.6%) described as strength the increased awareness of the 
general public and pig producers on the importance of biosecurity following the outbreak. Eight 
producers (8.7%) believed the management of the outbreak improved preparedness for potential 
future outbreaks; and nine producers (9.8%) thought that airport security, control of entry and 
quarantine measures applied were the main strength of the outbreak management.  
A total of 130 producers responded to the qualitative open question about what could have been 
done to improve the management of the outbreak. Among respondents, 47 (36.2%) indicated that 
using an appropriate name of the disease, instead of ‘Swine Influenza’, would have improved the 
management of the outbreak. Some producers (33/130; 25.4%) believed the information available 
to the public as well as that provided to pig producers was not accurate. A general comment was the 
lack of appropriate information on the safety of the consumption of pork products. Twenty-one 
producers (16.2%) indicated that the media coverage was unnecessarily alarmist and provided 
misleading information. A similar number of producers (24/131; 18.5%) indicated that the control 
measures applied to incoming overseas travellers into Australia were not stringent enough. A lower 
proportion of producers (7/130; 5.4%) believed that the outbreak could have been better managed 
if more resources were allocated to vaccine manufacturing and distribution.  
 
2.3. Impacts of the human pandemic H1N1/09 outbreak  
 
2.3.1. Biosecurity practices 
Producers were asked to identify those biosecurity practices applied on-farm before and during the 
H1N1/09 outbreak in humans from a list of practices provided in the questionnaire. Regarding this 
question, three options were provided: 1. Practice was already applied before the outbreak; 2. 
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Practice was adopted during the outbreak; and, 3. Practice not applied (before or during).  Table 3 
describes these practices and producers’ responses on their use before and during the H1N1/09 
outbreak. Moderate to high levels of biosecurity practices applied on farm before the H1N1/09 
outbreak in humans were identified among respondents. However, some of the biosecurity practices 
applied on-farm differed according to herd size, with higher level of biosecurity compliance observed 
among larger farms (Table 4).   
 
 
 
Changes in producers’ practices due to the H1N1/09 outbreak (practices that were adopted after the 
outbreak began) were observed in those practices related to the potential risk of disease 
introduction posed by visitors (Table 3). The most significant change was observed for producers 
asking visitors if they had recently been overseas (27.8%) and producers not allowing any visitor to 
inspect their pigs (18.3%). A lower proportion of producers adopted the practice of having a 
controlled entry of visitors (7.3%) and making visitors to wash their hands and scrub their fingernails 
(8.6%) due to the H1N1/09 outbreak occurring.   
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Activities and practices adopted by producers in response to the H1N1/09 outbreak and associations 
of these practices with herd size are shown in Table 5. A similar proportion of producers stated 
asking their employees to notify if they or any people in their close contacts had flu like symptoms 
(44.0%), consulting a veterinarian or a pig health specialist on H1N1/09 (37.9%) and visiting websites 
to seek information on H1N1/09 (41.8%). A lower proportion (9.3%) reported attending a meeting or 
an information session on influenza. For all practices, a significantly higher adoption was observed 
among farms with more than 100 sows than among smaller farms.  
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2.3.2. Level of stress 
Only five producers, representing 2.9% of respondents, reported a reduction in pig sales during the 
outbreak of H1N1/09 in humans. Approximately one third of producers (32.8%) reported being 
financially stressed (moderately to extremely) during the outbreak. Similarly, 26.7% of producers felt 
emotionally distressed. Interestingly, more producers were distressed about the health of their pigs 
(38.2%) than about their own health (16.7%). The only significant difference (P = 0.028) observed 
was on the level of stress about the health of the pigs according to the farm location. Those 
producers from NSW and SA were less stressed (26.0% moderately to extremely stressed) about the 
health of their pigs than producers from QLD (48.5%), VIC/TAS (48.6%) and WA (54.2%).  
 
2.4. Sources of information 
Producers were asked whether they were interested in information on the H1N1/09 outbreak in 
humans and the animal health issues of the outbreak. The vast majority of producers were 
moderately to extremely interested in the information about the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans 
(82%) and the animal health issues of the outbreak (90%). Results in relation to sources of 
information are shown in Table 6. The most important sources of information (sources considered 
moderately to extremely important) according to producers were APL (93%), veterinarians (89%) 
and the state Department of Primary Industries (DPI) (75%). However, differences on importance of 
some sources of information were observed according to herd size, location of the farm and gender 
of respondents. Results of the multivariable logistic regression models are shown in Table 7.  
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Results indicate that television, radio and other farmers were considered more important sources of 
information by farmers managing smaller herds, while veterinarians were considered more 
important by farmers managing larger herds. Moreover, internet was considered more important (P 
= 0.046) by females (75.6%) than males (58.5%). No significant differences were observed regarding 
the importance of APL, DPI and the Federal government as sources of information between the 
tested explanatory variables.  
Producers were asked about their most trusted information source in relation to animal health 
issues of the H1N1/09 outbreak in an open question. Among respondents (n = 171), APL was 
mentioned as the most trusted source of information by 62.6% of producers, followed by 
veterinarians (45.6%). Only 11.6% of producers mentioned the state DPI as one of the most trusted 
source of information. The proportion of producers who mentioned veterinarians differed according 
to herd size (P = 0.01), with fewer small producers (< 99 sows) stating this option compared to larger 
producers (> 100 sows) (26.3% and 57.0%, respectively).   
 
3. Discussion 
Several studies have investigated public perceptions about the Influenza Pandemic H1N1/09 
(Goodwin et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2009; Dhand et al., 2011; Lau et al., 2011); however, limited 
information is available on pig producers’ perceptions and experiences (Goodwin et al., 2011). This 
cross-sectional observational study was conducted at the height of the outbreak in the human 
population in Australia and before the virus was reported for the first time in an Australian piggery in 
July 2009 (OIE, 2009b; Holyoake et al., 2011). The survey population (APL members) included 460 
producers among an estimated total 1,351 pig producers in Australia (APL, 2010). There is potential 
bias in the study population towards more progressive producers; however the research team 
considered this to be the best approach for reaching the higher number of producers in a short 
period of time.  
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A survey response rate of 39.6% is considered low to moderate, but is considerably higher than rates 
obtained in other single mail-out surveys among pig producers in Australia (Pearson et al., 2008, 
11.3%; Schembri, 2009, 29%).  Response rates for postal, self-completed questionnaires tend to be 
relatively low (10-50%), depending on the study sponsor, the nature of the respondent population, 
the subject and aim of the study and the length of the questionnaire (Thrusfield, 2007) . Moreover, 
response rates in epidemiologic surveys have been declining worldwide in the last 30 years with 
more significant declines in the last decade (Galea and Tracy, 2007). The low to moderate response 
rate achieved in the current study could have biased study results although the bias is not caused by 
the low response rate per se. Bias occurs if respondents are systematically different from non-
respondents, which does not appear to be the case in this study. Among respondents, most 
producers (77%) had less than 500 sows, which is a similar proportion to that estimated among all 
Australian pig producers (71%) (APL, 2010). Moreover, the distribution of respondents by state 
aligns with the distribution of all pig producers in Australia (NSW 26%, QLD 21%, SA 18%, VIC 22%, 
WA 12% and TAS 1%) (APL, 2010). These similarities with the known pig producer population in 
Australia support the validity and representativeness of the results of this survey.  
Pig producers had good general knowledge on potential transmission pathways for H1N1/09 
between people (Table 2). Producers believed that most H1N1/09 was transmitted through direct or 
close contact with a sick person. Similar perceptions were reported among pig producers in 
Malaysia, who believed that avoiding crowds and contact with infected people were effective ways 
of protection against H1N1/09 infection (Goodwin et al., 2011). Perceptions on transmission 
pathways among pig producers were also similar to those reported by the general public in the 
Greater Sydney area (Dhand et al., 2011). However, a much lower proportion of pig producers than 
general public had misperceptions about ways of contracting H1N1/09. As expected, a very low 
proportion of pig producers believed that eating cooked pork (0.6%) and handling uncooked pig 
meat (1.7%) could pose a risk for contracting H1N1/09; while these proportions among the general 
public were 15.6% and 22.8%, respectively (Dhand et al., 2011). In agreement with these elevated 
risk perceptions of the general public, a study on public perceptions of H1N1/09 in Hong Kong, 
reported 7% of respondents believed that eating well-cooked pork posed a risk of transmission of 
the virus. These public misperceptions had a negative impact on pork consumption, with a reduced 
consumption reported by 6% to 11% of different survey respondents (APL, 2009; Goodwin et al., 
2009; Dhand et al., 2011). Despite this, a very low proportion of pig producers stated a decreased 
number of pigs sold during the H1N1/09 outbreak in humans. The potential economic impact on pig 
enterprises of incorrectly associating pork products with the risk of infection, and the on-going 
communication and information delivery from APL, could have enhanced pig producers’ knowledge 
on H1N1/09 potential transmission pathways, although it would appear that equivalent 
communications from various sources to the public may have been less successful.  
A proportion of producers stated being more stressed about the health of their pigs than about their 
own health, and over 60% of producers believed an outbreak of H1N1/09 in pigs was likely to occur. 
Interestingly, the first H1N1/09 outbreak in a piggery in Australia was reported in the following 
weeks after this study was conducted (OIE, 2009b). Producers’ concerns about their own health 
were more significant among pig producers in Malaysia (Goodwin et al., 2011) than among pig 
producers in Australia. Differences in producers’ demographics and level of knowledge on H1N1/09 
and the management of the outbreak between countries could be some of the reasons for the 
difference in risk perception. Moreover, most producers in the current study believed they had 
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stringent disease prevention practices and were well prepared to prevent and control an outbreak in 
pigs. However, a significant proportion of producers identified less than three clinical signs of swine 
influenza in pigs and some stated not knowing the clinical signs caused by the disease. The lack of 
information on the epidemiology of H1N1/09 infection in pigs and the free-status of ‘classical’ swine 
influenza among pigs in Australia could have influenced these producers’ perceptions and 
knowledge. 
Although moderate to high level of on-farm biosecurity practices before the H1N1/09 outbreak in 
humans were identified among respondents, this level, as expected, was higher among larger herds. 
Previous research suggested that small-scale pig producers had poorer on-farm biosecurity 
practices, poorer disease knowledge and understanding of swill feeding, and limited veterinary 
contact (Schembri et al., 2006; Schembri, 2009; Van Metre et al., 2009). Some of the practices that 
should be improved, especially among smaller farms, are keeping records of farm visitors and 
training of piggery workers in emergency disease recognition. External validity of the level of on-
farm biosecurity practices to the whole pig industry should be considered with caution, as more APL 
members than non-members might have an on-farm quality assurance program, which could 
indicate better on-farm biosecurity. The biosecurity changes reported during the H1N1/09 outbreak 
in humans were those to prevent H1N1/09 introduction through piggery visitors. In addition, some 
activities such as consultation with a veterinarian, visiting websites and asking employees to notify 
flu-like symptoms, were adopted after the outbreak began. These activities were also more 
prevalent among larger farms.  
Most pig producers reported being interested in information about the H1N1/09 outbreak in 
humans and the potential for animal disease. Veterinarians were considered to be important 
information sources by producers with larger herds, whilst other sources of information (television, 
radio and other farmers), were more important among producers with smaller herds. Information 
received by small-scale pig producers might be less accurate than that received by large-scale 
producers. A previous study among pig producers trading at livestock markets in Australia, reported 
a similar trend, with large-scale producers (> 150 sows) considering the veterinarian and APL the 
most useful sources of information, while small-scale producers were reluctant to approach APL and 
the state DPI and preferred seeking advice from other producers, family and friends (Schembri, 
2009). Stone (2005) and Maller and Carr (2007) described two categories of valid sources of 
information, trusted sources, such as veterinarians, rural suppliers and friends, and independent 
authorities, such as internet, government and magazines. Although the latter category has been 
linked to small landholder’s willingness to learn, small landholders’ generally held a negative 
perception of government.  In previous studies in Australia, small-scale pig producers tended to 
associate government with punitive measures (Schembri, 2009). Similarly, it has been suggested that 
small landholders rely on their own experiences and those of their neighbours and friends, rather 
than seeking advice from government and are not considered to be part of the mainstream 
production and industry groups (Sanson and Fairweather, 2004; Maller and Carr, 2007). Confidence 
and trust in individuals and information services have been proven to be generated through historic 
links and positive and reliable relationships (McKenzie J. , 2007). 
Unlike other studies that suggest that women are more likely to be interested in and seek 
information regarding health issues (Kassulke et al., 1993; Taylor, 2009), gender differences in 
interest on H1N1/09 information were not observed. The only significant gender difference noted in 
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this section was that women considered the internet a more important information source than 
men.  
Producers believed that the H1N1/09 outbreak was better managed by the pork industry than by the 
health authorities, with praise for APL as a source for reliable information compared to perceived 
inaccuracies in broader public media sources. As Briggs and Nichter (2009) indicated, politicians and 
health authorities during the H1N1/09 outbreak opted for two rhetorical moves, raising alarm and 
reassuring the public at the same time. This approach might have contributed to the perceptions of 
inaccuracy of the information delivered. Moreover, the incorrect naming of the disease as ‘swine flu’ 
was a major concern among pig producers. During the initial days of the outbreak, WHO used the 
name of ‘swine flu’ in their press briefs, stating that the virus was a swine influenza virus. However, 
pressure from the pork industry due to direct consequences of the incorrect naming, changed 
WHO’s position and since 30 April 2009 the agency had not mentioned this name in any official 
statement (Enserink, 2009). Despite this change in position and a joint statement on the safety of 
pork by the WHO, OIE and FAO, the outbreak caused a significant impact on the pig industry (Vallat, 
2009).  
Findings of this study indicate that pig producers had good understanding and perceptions of the 
potential risks of contracting H1N1/09 and fewer misconceptions than the general public. Producers 
were concerned about the health of their pigs and the outbreak in humans caused an improvement 
in those biosecurity practices preventing the transmission of the virus from humans to pigs. The 
industry body was in general considered the most important and trusted source of information; 
however, this study identified differences on the trusted sources of information among large and 
small-scale pig producers. Communication and extension programs in future outbreaks should 
consider the needs of all sectors of the pig industry to increase their effectiveness.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of Australian Pork Limited for the distribution of the 
postal survey among its members and the contribution of Ms Chloe Procter and Ms Ugyen Lhamo for 
entering data. The authors are grateful to the Faculty of Veterinary Science, The University of Sydney 
for providing funding to conduct this study. The authors sincerely thank all the pig producers who 
responded to the questionnaire.  
 
 
References 
APL, 2009. Australian Pork Limited Media Release - Consumers happy to keep Pork on their fork.pdf.  
Australian Pork Limited. 
APL, 2010. Australian Pig Annual 2009-2010. In: Limited, A.P. (Ed.), Canberra. 
Briggs, C.L., Nichter, M., 2009. Biocommunicability and the Biopolitics of Pandemic Threats. Medical 
Anthropology 28, 189-198. 
Chan, M., 2009. World now at the start of 2009 influenza pandemic: statement to the press by WHO 
Director-General Dr Margaret Chan, 11 June 2009. WHO. 
Dhand, N.K., 2010. UniLogistic: A SAS Macro for Descriptive and Univariable Logistic Regression 
Analyses. Journal of Statistical Software, Code Snippets 35, 1-15. 
16 | P a g e  
 
Dhand, N.K., Hernandez-Jover, M., Taylor, M., Holyoake, P., 2011. Public perceptions of the 
transmission of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 from pigs and pork products in Australia. 
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 98, 165-175. 
Enserink, M., 2009. Swine flu outbreak: Swine flu names evolving faster than swine flu itself. Science 
324, 871-871. 
Franzosi, R., 2004. Content analysis. In: Hardy, M., Bryman, A. (Eds.), Handbook of data analysis. Sage 
Publications, London, UK. 
Galea, S., Tracy, M., 2007. Participation rates in epidemiologic studies. Ann. Epidemiol. 17, 643-653. 
Gibbs, A.J., Armstrong, J.S., Downie, J.C., 2009. From where did the 2009 'swine-origin' influenza A 
virus (H1N1) emerge? Virology Journal 6. 
Goodwin, R., Haque, S., Hassan, S.B.S., Dhanoa, A., 2011. Representations of swine flu: perspectives 
from a Malaysian pig farm. Public Understanding of Science 20, 477-490. 
Goodwin, R., Haque, S., Neto, F., Myers, L.B., 2009. Initial psychological responses to Influenza A, 
H1N1 ("Swine flu"). Bmc Infectious Diseases 9. 
Holyoake, P.K., Kirkland, P.D., Davis, R.J., Arzey, K.E., Watson, J., Lunt, R.A., Wang, J., Wong, F., 
Moloney, B.J., Dunn, S.E., 2011. The first identified case of pandemic H1N1 influenza in pigs 
in Australia. Australian Veterinary Journal 89, 427-431. 
Kassulke, D., Stennerday, K., Coory, M., Ring, I., 1993. Information-seeking behavior and sources of 
health information - Associations with risk factor status in an analysis of 3 queensland 
electorates. Australian Journal of Public Health 17, 51-57. 
Kou, Z., Hu, S.N., Li, T.X., 2009. Genome evolution of novel influenza A (H1N1) viruses in humans. 
Chinese Science Bulletin 54, 2159-2163. 
Lau, J.T.F., Griffiths, S., Au, D.W.H., Choi, K.C., 2011. Changes in knowledge, perceptions, preventive 
behaviours and psychological responses in the pre-community outbreak phase of the H1N1 
epidemic. Epidemiology and Infection 139, 80-90. 
Lau, J.T.F., Griffiths, S., Choi, K.C., Tsui, H.Y., 2009. Widespread public misconception in the early 
phase of the H1N1 influenza epidemic. Journal of Infection 59, 122-127. 
Maller C., K.R., Carr A., 2007. Biosecurity and small landholders in peri-urban Australia In: Science, 
B.o.R. (Ed.), Canberra, 100. 
McKenzie J. , N.R., Coutts J., 2007. Capacity building resource manual.  Rural Industries Research and 
Development Corporation, Barton, ACT, 79. 
OIE, W.O.f.A.H., 2009a. A/H1N1 influenza, Canada, (Immediate notification: 02/05/2009). 
OIE, W.O.f.A.H., 2009b. Influenza A subtype H1N1, Australia, (Immediate notification: 31/07/2009). 
OIE, 2009c. Swine Influenza. 
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/SWINE_IN
F_FINAL.pdf (Accessed 16th August 2011).  
Pearson, H., Lapidge, S., Toribio, J-A. (2008) Understanding domestic pig and wildlife interactions in 
commercial piggeries in Australia – Survey. Australian Vertebrate Pest Control Conference, 
Darwin, Northern Territory. 
Sanson R., C.A., Fairweather J.R., 2004. A study of smallholdings and their owners Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Wellington, 55. 
Schembri, N., 2009. Biosecurity practices of producers trading pigs at saleyards and improved 
traceability systems. Faculty of Veterinary Science. University of Sydney, Camden. 
17 | P a g e  
 
Schembri, N., Hart, K., Petersen, R., Whittington, R., 2006. Assessment of the management practices 
facilitating the establishment and spread of exotic diseases of pigs in the Sydney region. 
Australian Veterinary Journal 84, 341-348. 
Stone, G., 2005. Agribusiness role in extension, education and training: A case study In: Corporation, 
R.I.R.a.D. (Ed.), Canberra, 134. 
Taylor, M., Raphael, B., Barr, B., Agho, K., Stevens, G., Jorm, L., 2009. Public health measures during 
an anticipated influenza pandemic: Factors influencing willingness to comply. Risk 
Management and Health Care Policy 2, 9-20. 
Thrusfield, M., 2007. Veterinary Epidemiology. Blackwell Science Ltd. Oxford, UK. 
Vallat, B., 2009. OIE’s role in the pandemic influenza H1N1 2009.  OIE. 
Van Metre, D.C., Barkey, D.Q., Salman, M.D., Morley, P.S., 2009. Development of a syndromic 
surveillance system for detection of disease among livestock entering an auction market. 
Javma-Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association 234, 658-664. 
WHO, 2009a. Swine Influenza: Statement by WHO Director-General, Dr Margaret Chan, 25 April 
2009.  
WHO, 2009b. Joint FAO/WHO/OIE/WTO Statement on influenza A(H1N1) and the safety of pork. 
WHO, 2010. Influenza A(H1N1) – update 110. 
Wong, F., Daniels, P., Komadina, N., Barr, I., Harrower, B., Deng, Y.M., 2011. Characterisation of 
A(H1N1) 2009 Pandemic Influenza Viruses from Across the Human-Animal Interface in 
Australian Swine Herds. Ecohealth 7, S31-S31. 
 
  
 
 
 
